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ABSTRACT
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) emerged in 2012 has since resulted in
sporadic cases, intra-familial transmission and major outbreaks in healthcare settings. The clinical
picture of MERS-CoV includes asymptomatic infections, mild or moderately symptomatic cases and
fatal disease. Transmissions of MERS-CoV within healthcare settings are facilitated by overcrowding,
poor compliance with basic infection control measures, unrecognized infections, the superspreaders
phenomenon and poor triage systems. The actual contributing factors to the spread of MERS-CoV are
yet to be systematically studied, but data to date suggest viral, host and environmental factors play a
major role. Here, we summarize the known factors for the diverse transmission of MERS-CoV.
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Introduction
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) was initially
recognized in 2012 and since then a total of 1621 cases have
been reported from 26 countries, with a case fatality rate of
36% [1]. The disease has a wide range of clinical presentation
and epidemiology [2–6]. Three main factors contribute to the
transmission of MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV): the virus, the
host, and the environment. With regard to the patterns of
transmission, three patterns have been recognized: sporadic
transmission, limited intrafamilial transmission, and health-
care-associated transmissions. Here, we review the available
data regarding the diversity of transmission and summarize
known risk factors for such transmission.
Clinical presentation
One of the reasons for the delayed diagnosis of MERS cases is the
wide clinical spectrum of MERS, which ranges from asympto-
matic to mild upper respiratory tract symptoms to acute fulmi-
nant pneumonia associated with multisystem failure and death
[2–6]. The most common presentations among hospitalized
MERS patients were fever, cough, shortness of breath, and clin-
ical and radiological evidence of pneumonia [7–10]. Patients may
also present with nonspecific symptoms such as fatigue, myalgia,
fever, cough, headache, vomiting, and diarrhea [7–10]. Patients
with severe disease develop respiratory failure secondary to
acute lung injury, and may develop renal failure and coagulo-
pathy [11–15]. The case fatality rate is related to the viral load,
severity of the disease, and the presence of comorbidities [11–
15]. In a recent study, multivariate analysis revealed predictors of
mortality as: age >60 years (odds ratio [OR] 11.7), underlying
illness (OR 5.19), lower Ct values where the odds of death
increased 17% for each 1 point drop in Ct (OR 1.17) [16]. The
risk of death in patients with MERS was significantly associated
with age >65 years (9.3 times that of younger patients) and
treatment for underlying diseases (7.8 times that of other
patients) [17]. Themajority (>95%) of the cases of MERS infection
occur in adults and older adults with one or more comorbidities,
and few cases occurred among children [18,19]. Comorbidities
associated with MERS-CoV infection include: diabetes mellitus,
renal failure, and hypertension, as shown in Table 1 [7,9,12,13,20].
The diagnosis of MERS-CoV infection is based on the
detection of viral RNA in respiratory samples such as naso-
pharyngeal swabs, bronchoalveolar wash, or sputum using
real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) assays targeting upE and ORF1b regions of the
MERS-CoV genome [7,21]. Currently, the detection of
MERS-CoV in respiratory samples is considered the gold
standard for the diagnosis of MERS in a clinical setting.
Lower or deeper respiratory samples were more likely to
be positive for MERS-CoV than upper respiratory samples
and thus these samples are the preferred method of testing
using real-time PCR [16,21]. Viral loads in lower respiratory
samples were at least 100 times more compared to upper
respiratory tract samples (5 × 106 vs. 1.9 × 104 cop/mL,
respectively) [22]. Serology using immunofluorescence,
serum neutralization, or protein microarray assays adds
additional diagnostic methods for the detection of MERS-
CoV antibodies, but most of these tests require a minimum
of 3 weeks postinfection to reveal positive results
[21,23–26].
Different serologic tests were used for the diagnosis of
MERS-CoV infection, which included: plaque reduction neu-
tralization tests (PRNTs), microneutralization (MN) test,
MERS-CoV-spike pseudoparticle neutralization test (ppNT),
and MERS-CoV S1-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) antibody test [27]. These antibody detection tests
(PRNT, MN, ppNT, and ELISA test) have an excellent
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sensitivity of 94–100% [27]. The ppNT does not require
biosafety level (BSL)-3 containment [27–30]. In one study,
serum dilutions causing plaque reductions of 90%
(PRNT90) and 50% (PRNT50) showed that the use of
PRNT50 detects few infections that were not detected by
PRNT90 tests [25]. However, these tests were not used for
diagnostic purposes, and the exact sensitivity and specifi-
city of MERS-CoV antibody tests in clinical settings are not
known.
Drivers for MERS-CoV transmission
Three main patterns of the transmission of MERS-CoV are
well characterized. These include: sporadic transmission,
intrafamilial transmission, and health-care-associated trans-
missions [31–38]. Of all the cases in Saudi Arabia, 45%
were health-care-associated infections, 38% were primary
cases, and 13% were among household contacts [39]. The
source of the infection in the remaining 4% was not
reported [39]. The dynamics of the transmission of MERS-
CoV possibly involves small animals, such as bats, and
dromedary camels of Africa, with the importation of
camels into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia resulting in sub-
sequent zoonotic transmission. These sporadic cases then
lead to intrafamilial transmission and outbreaks in the
health-care settings (Figure 1).
Animal to human transmission
Primary cases occurring in the community are thought to be
linked to dromedary camels [40,41]. The evidence for dro-
medary camels as a potential source of infections relies on
Table 1. A summary of comorbidities among MERS patients in different studies.
Al-Tawfiq et al.
[9]
Arabi et al.
[12]
Asiri et al.
[7]
Shalhoub et al.
[15]
Assiri et al.
[13]
Korean CDC
[20]
Grand
total
% of the
total
Number 17 12 47 24 23 186 309
Diabetes mellitus 13 8 32 15 17 52 137 71.0
Cardiac disease 11 7 13 0 9 42 82 42.5
Chronic Renal
failure
5 23 10 12 9 59 30.6
Hemodialysis 5 1 6 12 6.2
Malignancy 1 1 1 0 43 46 23.8
Hypertension 6 6 16 18 46 23.8
Figure 1. The dynamics of the transmissions of MERS-CoV involves possibly small animals such as bats, dromedary camels in Africa with the importation of camels
into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with subsequent zoonotic transmission,. These sporadic cases then lead to intra-familial transmission (house) and outbreaks in the
healthcare settings (hospital).
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four different lines of evidence. These lines of evidence are:
the high seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies in dromed-
ary camels, shepherds and abattoir, [42–45] as well as simi-
larity in the genome sequences of MERS-CoV from
dromedary and human specimens, [40,44–47] the isolation
of MERS-CoV from camels, [48–50] and serological evidence
that animal infection preceded the human infection in the
Jeddah case [41,51]. The exact mode of transmission of
MERS-CoV from dromedary camels to humans remains to
be elucidated. In a recent case-control study, 30 primary
cases were matched to 116 controls [52]. The answers of
the questions for the primary cases were provided by family
members in 57% of instances compared to 1% in the con-
trol group [52]. In a univariate analysis, the following risks
were significant: direct physical contact with a dromedary
camel during the last 6 months, household members fre-
quently visited farms with dromedaries, household members
had direct contact with dromedaries during the exposure
period, dromedaries were present on farm, milked dromed-
aries while on farm, household members visited a farm with
dromedaries during the exposure period, and any direct
contact with a dromedary camel during the exposure period
[52]. In a multivariate analysis, risks were associated with
direct dromedary exposure in the preceding two weeks,
diabetes mellitus, heart disease, and current tobacco smok-
ing [52]. In June 2012, the investigation of the source of
MERS-CoV around the house of the first patient in Bisha
showed that a sample from a Taphozous perforatus bat
(Egyptian tomb bat) had 100% identity to the human
MERS-CoV cloned from the index case-patient [53]. There
are no studies of bats in Saudi Arabia to further confirm
this finding.
Seasonal pattern of MERS-CoV transmission
MERS-CoV seems to have two seasons for the transmission:
March–May and September–November [54–56]. The reason for
the increased cases in April–May 2014 was the occurrence of
the Jeddah outbreak, the associated increase in the number of
tests performed, [57] and increased health-care-associated
transmission[5,57]. So increased surveillance identified more
cases, although the overall percentage of patients identified
did not differ significantly between Jeddah (4.6%) and other
cities (5.2%) in the same time period [57]. In addition, data
showed that the seroepidemiology is low in Saudi Arabia with
an overall prevalence of 0.15% of 10,007 screened indivi-
duals [24].
Any seasonal variation may reflect the risk of transmis-
sion of MERS-CoV between animals and humans, seasonal
variation in the circulation of the virus in animals, and the
natural reservoirs of MERS-CoV [56]. A study evaluating the
seasonality of MERS-CoV transmission showed that MERS-
CoV infections followed influenza A epidemics, and most of
the influenza waves did not co-occur with the MERS-CoV
waves [58]. It is important to study the factors leading to
this seasonality of MERS-CoV, such as parturition of camels.
Intrafamilial transmission
The majority of reported MERS cases were secondary cases
due to human-to-human transmission. The transmission
occurred within family clusters, [2–4,25] community set-
tings, [32,59] travel-associated transmission, [60–64] and
health-care settings [4,9,20,57,65–71]. The transmission
within any particular family is also variable and the factors
leading to heterogeneity in transmission had not been
elucidated. In an outbreak in Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah,
61% were health-care-associated, 28% were primary cases,
and 11% were among family members [59]. Genomic test-
ing of MERS-CoV is needed to accompany any cluster
investigation to examine the relatedness of the cases to
each other. An investigation of a family cluster in Hafr Al-
Bain, Saudi Arabia, indicated that certain cases in the same
family were not related to the cluster, but these cases were
caused by community transmissions [72].
The evaluation of contacts of the first MERS case was
extended to the patient’s family contacts, which included
three wives, 10 sons, 11 daughters, 12 grandchildren, and
one house maid; two Shepherds and 14 health-care workers
[33]. None of the 53 contacts was MERS-CoV-positive by
PCR [33].
Health-care-associated transmission
The largest data on contact investigation revealed that the
percentage of positive cases was 2.5%, 1.12%, and 3.03%
among hospital patients, health-care worker contacts, and
family contacts, respectively [73]. Thus, the transmission of
MERS-CoV among family members seems to be variable.
Possible factors leading to heterogeneity in transmissions
may include: genetic predisposition, severity of the dis-
ease, and other environmental factors.
It is clear that health-care-associated infections of MERS-
CoV contribute significantly to the increased number of
cases. Since 2012, there had been many large outbreaks in
the health-care setting involving many facilities. Examples of
these outbreaks include: Al-Hasa outbreak, Zarqa outbreak in
Jordan, Jeddah, Taif, and the Republic of Korea
[13,20,57,58,65,67,71]. In Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, 23 confirmed
cases and 11 probable cases constituted the outbreak [13].
Further genotyping studies revealed multiple introduction of
MERS-CoV into the hospital outbreak [74]. Between 17
February and 26 April 2014, a multiple health-care-associated
MERS outbreak took place in Jeddah and involved 14 hospi-
tals [5,57]. Of all the cases in that outbreak, 60% of the cases
resulted from health-care-associated transmission [75].
Factors contributing to the transmissions and increased num-
ber of cases included: sensitive case definition, active search
for cases, and contact tracing [57]. In 2015, a large MERS
outbreak occurred in the Republic of Korea [76]. The out-
break was epidemiologically linked to a single patient who
visited multiple countries in the Arabian Peninsula [76]. The
outbreak resulted the quarantine of 17,000 contacts as of 20
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July 2015 [77–80]. And the outbreak resulted in a total of 186
cases and 36 deaths in a short time [81].
Variability of intrahospital transmission of MERS-
CoV
Variable intrahospital transmissions occurred among contacts
of MERS patients. Among the contacts of the first case, none
of the 48 health-care workers who had significant contact
during the patient’s stay of 10 days in the private hospital in
Jeddah were positive [12].
Factors contributing to health-care-associated
transmissions
The described health-care-associated transmissions are driven
by multiple factors. These factors include: late recognition,
overcrowding, inadequate infection control precautions, pro-
longed viral shedding, and the occurrence of superspreading
events [32]. The exact definition of a superspreader is not well
defined. In one study of SARS, a ‘superspreading event’ was
defined as transmission of SARS to at least eight contacts, [82]
and others used the term to refer to individuals infecting
unusually large numbers of secondary cases [83,84]. A super-
spreading event was recognized during the SARS outbreak
when a flight attendant infected more than 100 patients in
Singapore [85–87]. In the Al-Hasa outbreak, a single patient
caused seven secondary cases; [13] thus, a superspreading
event may have contributed to the outbreak. The index case
in the Republic of Korea caused 27 secondary cases; one of
these cases caused 24 tertiary cases while another patient
caused 73 tertiary cases [80]. In the Republic of Korea out-
break, superspreaders contributed to the infection of 85, 28,
23, 11, and 6 from patients’ number 14, 1, 16, 76 and 15,
respectively [20]. Another secondary patient resulted in 91
tertiary MERS cases, of which 39% were other patients in the
emergency room, and 13% were health-care workers [88].
Table 2 provides a summary of possible superspreaders in
different SARS and MERS outbreaks [8,13,20,59,72,88].
Many theories have been given to explain the occurrence
of superspreading events and cited factors include the virus
characteristics, the host, the environment, and cultural and
travel-related behaviors. Other contributing factors include:
prolonged duration of exposure, the practice of seeking care
at multiple health-care facilities, frequent interhospital trans-
fer, and large numbers of contacts [20]. Additional factors
include: multi-bedded hospital rooms, crowded hospital
rooms, and aerosol-generating procedures [20].
Additional influencing factors include: viral mutation, dura-
tion of contact with an infectious host and routes of transmis-
sion of infections, genetic susceptibility, and underlying
comorbidities [89]. A higher viral load, more environmental
contacts, more interpersonal contacts, and complex network
of interactions made by individuals may also play further roles
in superspreading events.
Although initial studies showed that no significant muta-
tion was detected among MERS-CoV isolates, [57,90,91]
complete genome analysis of MERS-CoV showed genetic
recombination events between group 3 and group 5 of
clade B [92]. The significance of this recombination in the
transmissibility is not known [92]. Many patients with MERS
have underlying comorbidities [7]. In one study, 96% had
underlying comorbid medical disorders, including diabetes
(68%), hypertension (34%), chronic cardiac disease (28%),
and chronic renal disease (49%) [7]. The viral shedding
characteristics in those with comorbid diseases might be
different from healthy individuals. After 12 days from the
initial positive samples, 30% of contacts and 76% of cases
were still positive for MERS-CoV by PCR [89]. A health-care
worker shed MERS-CoV for about 42 days after initial sam-
ple [93].
Environmental persistence of the MERS-CoV virus was
recently investigated. In one study, it was found that MERS-
CoV survives well on surfaces and in the air and that the virus
is more stable at low temperature and low humidity condi-
tions [94]. Most of the touchable environments in rooms
where MERS-CoV patients were cared for were contaminated,
and viable virus could be isolated in three of the four
enrolled patients on days 18–27 after symptom onset [95].
Specimens from bed controller and thermometer were PCR-
positive until the fifth day from the last positive PCR of the
patient’s respiratory specimen [95]. Environmental factors
contributing to a superspreading event include air recircula-
tion, as occurred in the SARS outbreak at the Hotel
Metropole, Amoy Gardens housing complex, and a flight
between China and Canada [96]. The contribution of air
recirculation to the spread of MERS-CoV is yet to be
investigated.
The custom and behavior of the affected population
may also contribute to a superspreading event, and these
behaviors include: ‘doctor shopping’, traditional ways of
greetings, hugging and kissing. In the Republic of Korea
outbreak, the presence of many visitors and family mem-
bers staying with patients contributed to the superspread-
ing event [85]. Hospital environment may also contribute
Table 2. A summary of different outbreaks showing possible superspreading
events in MERS-CoV infection.
City
Number of
patient
Number of secondary
cases Reference
Al-Hasa 1 7 [13]
Most 3 [13]
Hafr Al-Batin 1 4 [72]
1 5 [72]
Al-Madinah 1 3 [59]
1 6 [59]
Riyadh Most 2–3 [8]
1 10 [8]
South Korea #1 28 [88]
#14 85 [88]
#15 6 [88]
#16 23 [88]
#76 11 [88]
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to the spread of the virus, and these include overcrowding,
multi-bedded rooms, and inadequate environmental
cleaning.
Asymptomatic individuals and prolonged viral
shedding
It is estimated that between one-fourth and one-fifth of
laboratory-confirmed MERS cases are asymptomatic. The
exact contribution of asymptomatic individuals and those
with prolonged viral shedding to the epidemiology and
transmission of MERS-CoV are not well characterized. A
recent survey of 225 patients with laboratory-confirmed
MERS found that 64 (25.1%) were reported as asymptomatic
at time of specimen collection; however, when 33 (52%) of
those patients were interviewed, 26 (79%) reported at least
one symptom that was consistent with a viral respiratory
illness [5,97]. It is estimated that between 20% and 25% of
laboratory-confirmed MERS cases are asymptomatic.
Prolonged viral shedding of patients and asymptomatic
contacts pose potential, important challenges for infection
control [25]. MERS-CoV was detected by RT-PCR for
18–24 days from the respiratory tract secretions [98].
Asymptomatic individuals were also described to harbor
MERS-CoV by RT-PCR [21]. Asymptomatic health-care work-
ers shed MERS-CoV for 42 days from 24 April to 12 June
2014 [93].
Expert commentary
Since the emergence of MERS-CoV in 2012, the virus caused
sporadic cases, intrafamilial transmission, and major outbreaks
in health-care settings. In particular, the transmission within
health-care settings is of major concern due to the potential to
cause large outbreaks even outside the Arabian Peninsula.
This is exemplified by the large outbreak in the Republic of
Korea. Transmissions of MERS-CoV within health-care settings
are facilitated by overcrowding, poor compliance with basic
infection control measures, unrecognized infections, the
superspreader phenomenon, and poor triage systems. The
actual contributing factors to the spread of MERS-CoV are
yet to be systematically studied, but data to date suggest
that viral, host, and environmental factors play a major role.
Understanding these factors and the contribution of each
factor to the superspreading events would further enhance
the control measures of MERS-CoV transmission. The epide-
miology of the disease was studied in many aspects and
showed propensity for the older and those with underlying
medical conditions. There is yet an unexplained low rate of
involvement of children. The clinical picture of MERS had been
further elucidated to include asymptomatic infections, mild or
moderately symptomatic cases, and fatal disease. This hetero-
geneity in the clinical presentation is similar to other known
infectious diseases and might be related to the immune
response. MERS-CoV is present in the lower respiratory tract
system for a prolonged period of time and at higher concen-
trations than those of the upper respiratory tract, the urine,
and the stool. This finding puts the MERS-CoV dynamics in the
same clinical presentation as SARS. The finding also has an
important role for the prospect of control in health-care
settings.
Five-year view
In the following years and months to come, it is important to
fill the knowledge gap in our understanding of the epide-
miology and transmission of MERS-CoV. It is important to
elucidate other intermediate and natural hosts of MERS-
CoV. Understanding the factors leading to the amplification
of transmission in health-care setting would provide further
tools for the control of the virus spread. Understanding the
heterogeneity in the transmission and clinical presentation
may also aid in the overall control measures. Understanding
the risk factors for the virus transmission within the commu-
nity and the hospital settings would enhance the ability to
control the transmission of MERS-CoV. The best strategies to
prevent the transmission within health-care facilities are to
further enhance the infection control measures and develop
a sustained system for the triage of patients presenting with
respiratory symptoms.
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Key issues
● MERS-CoV causes sporadic cases, intrafamilial transmission, and nosocomial infections.
● MERS clinical presentation ranges from mild or asymptomatic cases to severe and fatal disease.
● Transmission of MERS-CoV within health-care settings is facilitated by overcrowding, poor compliance with basic infection control measures,
unrecognized infections, the superspreader phenomenon, and poor triage systems.
● Contributing factors for superspreading phenomena include viral, host, and environmental factors.
● The virus is present in the lower respiratory tract system for prolonged period of time and at higher concentrations than the upper respiratory tract, the
urine, and the stool.
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